South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 6

2020

GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS
Uri Weiss
Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Joseph Agassi
Tel Aviv University and York University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Weiss, Uri and Agassi, Joseph (2020) "GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS," South Carolina
Journal of International Law and Business: Vol. 16 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol16/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL
ACCORDS
Uri Weiss ∗ and Joseph Agassi +
I.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF GAME THEORY .............................. 2

II. A COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR APPROACH AND THE
RELATED LITERATURE .............................................................. 9
III. ADDITIONAL MORALS TO LEARN FROM AUMANN’S
NOBEL LECTURE (2005) ......................................................... 15
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 22
Realpolitik is the claim that agreements in
international relations are worthless since there is no
institution to enforce them. Game theoretician Robert J.
Aumann suggests in his 2006 Nobel lecture that “the
fundamental insight is that repetition is like an enforcement
mechanism.” 1 The application of this insight to
international relations allows for the improvement of their
applicability and it, thus, refutes Realpolitik.
Early game theory appeared as an alternative to the
social sciences. However, it is better anchored within
social science—as a useful tool. This renders gametheoretical recommendations irenic. Aumann argues that
there is no a priori reason to expect that the agreement to
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cooperate should have practical results. 2 His claim rests
on an additional assumption: at times no improvement is
observed. Yet, at times significant improvement is
observed. This should encourage the search for the
conditions that lead to improvement; it goes well with the
proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social
science: how does playing in a given game depend on the
culture within which it takes place.

I.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF GAME THEORY

A common topic of discussion within game theory is the
prisoner’s dilemma and its relevance to cooperation because its
rules lead to conduct that reinforce conflict. When political
scientists, jurists, or biologists apply game theory to the analysis of
cooperation, they usually refer to this specific game. Of course,
many other games pertain to cooperation. It is not easy to find out
what game describes a situation sufficiently well in the field. It is
easier to find out what game is advantageous to play under what
circumstances. Such matters are better open to critical discussion
and empirical tests.
Before presenting the prisoner’s dilemma, let us present
another, simpler game, the movies dilemma, a variant of the
prisoner’s dilemma often present in film. Here it is:
Coop

Def

Coop

1, 1

3, 2

Def

2, 3

2, 2

Cooperate

Defect

Robert J. Aumann, Nash Equilibria Are Not Self-Enforcing, in
ECONOMIC
DECISION-MAKING:
GAMES,
ECONOMETRICS,
AND
OPTIMIZATION: CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF JACQUES H. DRÈZEE.
201– 206 (J.J. Gabszewicz,, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, eds. 1990).
2
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Cooperate

freedom, freedom

penalty, reduced penalty

Defect

reduced penalty,
penalty

reduced penalty, reduced
penalty

3

Figure 1. The Movies Dilemma
In this game, mutual cooperation is best for both players. To
achieve mutual cooperation they have to trust each other
sufficiently; if they mistrust one another, then they will come to
mutual defection; 3 one defection leads to the worst outcome. Thus,
if both players expect the other to either cooperate or defect, then
their very expectations will make it true. 4
In the movies dilemma, the information that one player has
about the decision of the opponent plays a crucial role. Therefore, in
variants of this game that allow the police to manipulate players
through misinformation, it may lead one player to expect the other
to defect. In that case, the expectation is self-fulfilling. Hence,
manipulation is unnecessary. It suffices for the police to convince
the players that the police will manage to convince one player that
the opponent will expect the other player to expect the opponent to
lose the trust of the one player.
In contrast, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, it is worthwhile for
each player to defect regardless of what the opponent does. This is
the whole of the specification of that game. In the literature, it
usually comes with a standard illustration that depicts a situation
with four options: no penalty and penalties of three levels: lenient,
severe, and medium—lenient penalty for the illegal possession of
arms, severe penalty for having used them illegally, and the

3
We use terms such as defection because they are common in the
game’s theoretical literature, but not because of their moral content. For
example, a firm that does not join a cartel defects in the game’s theoretical
language, although it should not be denounced.
4
This game appears in movies in diverse variants. For example,
one prisoner may seemingly betray the other, but without losing the other’s
trust. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may
result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a
new game of revenge. In all variants of the movies dilemma, the information
that one player has about the decision of the other player plays a crucial
role.
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reduction of the severe penalty that leaves it still harsher than the
lenient one. 5 Consider two persons detained for possession of illegal
weapons near a bank in which an armed robbery just took place. The
police have strong enough evidence to charge them with the lenient
penalty, but not enough evidence to charge them with the severe
penalty, so the police try to encourage them to testify against each
other. To achieve this, the police isolate them and propose to each
of them a plea-bargain. The options that the game offers are these:
if they both defect, they will both receive medium penalty; if they
cooperate with each other and keep silent then they will both receive
the lenient penalty. There are four levels of possible results, from 1
to 4:
Coop

Def

Coop

2, 2

4, 1

Def

1, 4

3, 3

Figure 2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Thus, the wish to maximize individual payoff imposes on each
player in the prisoner’s dilemma game the betrayal of the other
regardless of the strategy of the other. 6 A strategy like the one

Stuart Oskamp & Daniel Perlman, Factors Affecting
Co- operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 9 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 29–31
(1965).
6
This idea of strategy is as old as game theory. According to the
definition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern set forth in 1944, a strategy is
a player’s plan, which specifies what choices to make in every possible
situation, for all possible information available at the moment decision is
called for. The strategy conforms to the pattern of information that the rules
of the game prescribe. Thus, a strategy is a comprehensive policy, a plan for
action in every possible situation that the rules of the game allow.
Obviously, then, the project of Von Neumann and Morgenstern is utopian.
As Kenneth Arrow has noted, such a strategy is impossible even for chess—
a problem-situation much simpler than some real-life ones. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern postulated that comprehensive strategies are always parts
of games. This limits the applicability of game theory to the very simplest
5
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described here is not the only one available. It is dominant in the
sense that in all permissible situations a player will gain from it more
than from any alternative strategy; therefore, in this game a player
cannot gain anything from the information about the opponent.7
Hence, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, rationality precludes the
socially optimal result: it leads to the socially worst result. This is
why it is intriguing; the unpleasant aspect of the situation in the
prisoner’s dilemma is that the distrust inherent in it is irreparable,
since it imposes a result not improvable by soliciting trust. 8
In some similar games, raising the level of trust might improve
matters. The most common illustration for this is the variant of the
prisoner’s dilemma known as the stag-hunt game 9 (what makes
game theory interesting is that it offers many variants of this game
with different results; a little change in the game may, at times, lead
to a completely different result). In it, cooperation brings the best
payoff for each of them; the unilateral betrayal of one meets the
defector the second-best payoff and the other the worst payoff, and
mutual betrayal gives both the third-best payoff. For this, again, four
possible outcomes are required. This is illustrated by two hunters
who choose simultaneously whether to hunt a stag or rabbits. They
succeed only if they both go for a stag, and each player achieves the
best result—the stag. A player who goes for a stag alone is met with
absolute failure. A player who goes for a rabbit alone wins all the
rabbits, which is the second-best result, while both going for the

games, thus, limiting severely the intellectual challenge of game theory.
Sometimes it is surpassingly possible to write some strategies. The standard
examples are the always defect in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, as
discussed above, and the tit-for-tat in the same game. See JOHN VON
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1944) (ebook), https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lawsc/
reader.action?docID=1092486&ppg=2.
7
This is the equivalent to Savage’s “sure thing principle.” In the
early stages of game theory, it was called “the sure thing strategy.”
8
This may explain the futility in some situations of the good will
of peace activists who do not try to act politically, specifically in a way that
changes the game.
9
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma:
Coordination, Game Theory and the Law, 82 S. CALIF. L. REV. 13–15
(2008).
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rabbits mutually gives every player half of the rabbits—the thirdbest result. Therefore, it is best for both to go for the stag. For the
one who goes for the rabbits, it is better if the other does not, namely,
that the opponent goes for the stag (and loses), thus, enabling the
one to hunt rabbits unimpeded. Consider then four levels of success,
from 1 to 4:
Coop

Def

Coop

1, 1

4, 2

Def

2, 4

3, 3

Figure 3. The Stag-Hunt
Obviously, the absence of trust prevents the achievement of the
optimal solution in this game, while if the players trust each other
enough, they will achieve it. The important difference between the
two games is not in the stories, but in the matrices for it is possible
to translate the story of the stag-hunt game to the terms of the
prisoner’s dilemma game, and it will remain the stag-hunt game. For
example, if the two suspects from the prisoner’s dilemma game keep
silent, they will both walk; if they both sing, they will both receive
the usual penalty; and if only one sings, then only that one will
receive a lenient penalty, and the other will receive a heavy penalty.
Hence, the matrix determines the game, not its illustration.
The most important difference between the unrepeatable
prisoner’s dilemma and the unrepeatable stag-hunt is that in the
former game defection is the dominant strategy—each rational
player will defect in any case—whereas in the latter the defection
(or its avoidance) depends on the assessment of the interdependent
strategies of players. Whereas the one game offers no hope for
cooperation, the other offers recognition of the option of raising the
incentive for cooperation by raising trust. Hence, it is more
important to avoid situations that impose the prisoner’s dilemma
game rather than the stag-hunt game. 10 Although both games
describe conflict situations, the lesson for social science is that in

See Joseph Agassi & Abraham Meidan, Philosophy from a
Skeptical Perspective 96 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008).
10
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some conflict situations action can improve actors’ situations all
around even without eliminating the conflict.
The difference between variants of a game may, thus, be
significant. The decision about which variant describes a given
political situation already determines attitudes towards it. Thus,
bellicose game theoreticians set the game one way, and the irenic
ones set it the other way. This is Mario Bunge’s criticism of game
theory: it encourages arbitrariness. 11 The description of a real-life
situation as a game will, thus, be less arbitrary if it includes
options—whenever these are possible—for players to choose what
game to play, with whom, and with what payoffs. This decision as
to what game to play—this super game—describes some situations
better than the games prescribed in standard game-theoretical
texts. 12 This requires the recognition that at times some players are
able to choose what game to play next.
This is also the choice available to scholars who wish to use
game theory in order to analyze given situations: they may (and
possibly should) ask what games are available to players and what
game is better for a player to play. This will prescribe for scholars
the decision as to the choice of game to analyze—the most important
in the field. They may then help players or social planners improve
their lots by offering good advice. For example, in the sphere of
litigation, it is more important for students of jurisprudence to
analyze the asymmetric litigation game than the symmetric one, even
if the symmetric games are more frequent. 13 Only the asymmetric

11
See MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 180 (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1998) (ebook),
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/southcarolina/detail.action?docID=4
671968)
12
See id. at 176–80.
13
For example, Weiss analyzed the appeal game as an asymmetric
one, while Shavell analyzed the appeal game as a symmetric one. See Uri
Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Appealability, SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL
1 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1688877. Shavell noted that his
model is not valid in a case of heterogeneous litigants, and, nevertheless,
derives general policy recommendations from this model. The difference is

8
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game may hide unacceptable consequences for the weaker party.
The legal system may allow for situations in which weak litigants
cannot realize their rights or at least it is not worthy for them.
Legislators, judges, and attorneys for the weak litigants should try
to prevent these situations as the initial (super) game. This is a
worthy moral for the “law and economics” movement that aims to
assess which legal rules are economically efficient. The analysis of
the symmetric game—where options are the same for each side—is
elegant, easy, natural, and relatively easy to apply, but it is not the
most important game in town. Legal theory will benefit more from
research that will reduce the number of unavoidable injustices of the
system, and these are the asymmetric cases where financially
comfortable litigants have many more options, including those who
are less risk-averse due to their richness than ones who happen to be
financially constrained. 14 This may lead the weak parties to forego
the use of all the legal advantages that they have and settle for much
less than what the law entitles them. This is also the case when one
party is a one-time player, and the other party is a repeat player 15
(ironically, the literature considers this case not a part of “law and
economics” but a part of “law and society”; obviously, it is both).
Any move intended to compensate the less well-off litigant is a
revision that will lead jurists to prevent games that end up in patent
injustice. This is not limited to any specific society; the Bible
mentions asymmetric litigation: “seek judgment, relieve the
oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow.” 16
Admittedly, asymmetric games are usually mathematically less
elegant, but they are socially more important, at least from the
humanist perspective. Unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, many
situations of war and peace comprise asymmetric games. In many

not only that one analyzes this game and the other analyzes another game:
the important question is what game should be analyzed in the theory of
litigation. What game should we see when we recommend rules of
litigation? See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator
Incentives, 35 THE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES. 1, (2006).
14
See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, TEL
AVIV UNIV. L. FAC. PAPERS, 2005, at 1.
15
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
16
Isaiah 1:17.
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cases of violence, the strong party sees the game as asymmetric but
presents it as symmetric in efforts to fend off the police, the courts,
or public opinion. Even kids who are bullies in school do that when
facing school authorities. Under attack, then, it is often useful to
change the game by making a credible threat to involve the police,
the courts, and public opinion. Making a conflict visible may even
render an asymmetric game symmetric and thereby reduce violence
dramatically.

II. A COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR APPROACH AND THE
RELATED LITERATURE

Aumann (2009) claims:
incentive . . . has to be there, and that is what is represented
by the prisoner’s dilemma in very stark, obvious language
. . . . Absolutely, you must create incentives for stopping
CO2. There is one very simple way to do it. Just tax the
emissions. You could impose a much higher tax on
gasoline. And there are other ways to tax emissions. Do not
overtax them, but tax them at the true cost of these
emissions. Absolutely, you have to give incentives. Not by
fear: that is not going to work. What is going to work is
giving people incentives. Precisely game engineering. 17
We assume our readers are familiar with this, especially since
incentives can appear in different places and grow at different paces
depending on extant social and political conditions. Incentives can
be chosen as part of the game, such as in the case that a player
chooses a conditional strategy in the prisoner's dilemma, and they
can be chosen in order to prevent a particular kind of games. Let us
sharpen that in the example Aumann described, the social planner
actually supplies an incentive in order to prevent an undesirable
game, so it is actually a super-game.
Similarly, Aumann and Shapley show the need for social
science in order to explain the stability of the repeated prisoner’s

Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering, in DISCUSSION PAPER:
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RATIONALITY no. 518 (2009).
17
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dilemma—as due to the cooperation between players imposed by
the rule that requires penalty for those who do not punish:
it . . . should be noted . . . that not only are defections from
the cooperative sequence punished, but also defections
from any punishing sequence are punished. A player who
‘should’ punish and does not do so will himself be
punished. This is what provides the motivation for the
punisher actually to carry out the penalty, and so keeps [the
equilibrium]. 18
To this we add its converse: the same rules can destabilize the
prisoner’s dilemma itself and even eliminate it almost totally.
As to the context of any game, Aumann and Drèzee (2008)
observe this:
Formally, a game is defined by its strategy sets and payoff
functions. But in real life, many other parameters are
relevant; there is a lot more going on. Situations that
substantively are vastly different may nevertheless
correspond to precisely the same strategic game. For
example, in a parliamentary democracy with three parties,
the winning coalitions are the same whether the parties
each hold a third of the seats in parliament, or, say, 49
percent, 39 percent, and 12 percent, respectively. But the
political situations are quite different. The difference lies
in the attitudes of the players; in their expectations about
each other; in custom; and in history, though the rules of
the game do not distinguish between the two situations. 19
Let us comment on this: in Aumann’s example (or even in a
more extremist case of seats divided to 49%, 49%, 2%), traditional
game theory may deem the three political parties in possession of

Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, Long-Term
Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN GAME THEORY,
1– 15 (Megiddo N. ed., 1994).
19
Robert J. Aumann & Jacques H. Drèzee, Rational Expectations
in Games, 98 AM. ECON REV. 1, 72–86 (2008).
18
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equal power, since no party can establish a winning coalition by
itself, and each party can establish a winning coalition with every
other party. 20 Clearly, this is a mistake. Nevertheless, game theory
is right in considering the small party in this case as having much
more power than the number of its seats suggest and in its
explanation of this fact; but, game theory ignores the constraint on
the power of the small party that social norms of fairness impose.
Game theory also ignores the incentives that this situation provides
to change the situation radically. Thus, members of the big parties
may defect and establish small parties or the majority may change
the voting system. This invites interesting questions. How does the
prevalent view of fairness influence the situation? What is the right
view of fairness? How should it influence the situation? These
questions and their likes pull us out of the mathematical world of
game theory and lead us to apply social science. This illustrates the
fruitfulness of traditional game theory as well as its limitation.
Hence, to be fruitful, game theory should become part and parcel of
social science. Otherwise, game theory may generate more mistakes
than it can prevent.
In the conclusion of their paper, Aumann and Drèzee add this:
“The fundamental object of study in game theory should be the game
situation G rather than its underlying game G,” while in the paper
itself they define game situation as “a game played in a specific
context.” 21
As young as game theory is, it already has a tradition. That
tradition rests on its initial aim that was tacit. It was, we say, to
replace the explanatory model of the social sciences (indeed, one of
the early names of game theory was “social physics”). Von
Neumann and Morgenstern said of its applications that they are of
two kinds: “On the one hand to games in the proper sense, on the
other hand to economic and sociological problems as well . . . . We
hope to establish satisfactorily . . . that the typical problems of
economic behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical
notions of suitable games of strategy . . . .” For economic and social
problems, the games fulfill—or should fulfill—the same function,

20
21

See id.
Id. at 72, 82.
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which various geometrical-mathematical models have successfully
performed in the physical sciences. 22
The 2008 paper of Aumann and Drèzee just cited is possibly a
challenge to the tradition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, a stepin effort to revise it. In line with this we try to anchor the theory—
as is or in a revised version—within traditional social science. To
that end, we draw attention to the difference between Aumann 23
(1990) and Aumann and Drèzee (2008). Aumann (1990) claimed—
quite rightly—that agreement to play the stag-hunt game in mutual
cooperation is not self-enforcing. 24 He added that the agreement to
cooperate while playing the stag-hunt game does not bring about any
improvement. 25 This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an
oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations
of players that the result of the game depends on. Aumann’s
argument is this: both players will gladly agree to cooperate,
whether or not they later keep their word while playing; hence, their
explicit agreement conveys no information: “To say that a game is
non-cooperative means that there is no external mechanism
available for the enforcement of agreements . . . . Incentives can be
changed by changing either the payoffs or the information of the
players.” 26
Of course, one may see the custom of keeping promises as
irrational in any one-time game. This is a mistake. Expectations
regarding cooperation that rest on agreement are too common to
dismiss. Also, it will be beneficial for any specific society as well as
for the international community to reform the culture in a manner
that generates expectations to cooperate. That reform would render
the reliance on promises eminently rational. As such, agreements
tend to raise expectations; they improve the likelihood of achieving
cooperation even in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. This has
a significant effect also for international relations, where institution
to enforce contracts are still rather ineffective. This is in agreement
with Aumann: “In the international relations literature, the game has

22
23
24
25
26

VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 6, at 2.
Aumann, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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been called the ‘security dilemma.’” 27 Contrary to Aumann 1990,
however, we argue that international agreements in stag-hunt
situations improve the disposition to cooperate and that, therefore,
game theory rejects Realpolitik in international relations
(Realpolitik, to repeat, is the recommendation to consider all
agreements altogether worthless 28).
Aumann is quite right in asserting that there is no a priori reason
to expect agreement to cooperate to lead to cooperation. 29 The very
need to come to agreement may already signal potential mistrust
and, thus, mistrust and doubt as to the expectation that promises lead
to cooperation. Thus, Aumann’s assertion that there is no a priori
reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires
completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason
for that. 30 This then is an argument for the proposal to consider game
theory, part and parcel, of social science. How a given player will
behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which
the game takes place. Hence, the conclusion from the rules of the
game to the conduct of its players depends on tacit suppositions that
represent the social conditions under which they play the game.
These are better specified explicitly. The rules of the game called
game theory should be altered to include this demand. This will lead
to the proliferation of variants of many games that have, thus far,
already been considered exhaustively.
For example, in the traditional wording of the stag-hunt game,
the description of the set of alternatives is too sketchy: the option of
agreement is missing without notice. Therefore, when one mentions
it, one implicitly indicates that the game is not a closed system; it is,
then, not mathematics; at best, it is social science. Considered pure
mathematics, it does not have a unique solution: the conclusion that
agreement will lead to improvement is questionable and depends on
the expectation the agreement creates. In this regard, we agree with
Aumann.

27
28
29
30

Id.
Aumann, supra note 2.
Aumann, supra note 2, at 619–20.
See id.
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We can conclude from the above discussion that it is better to
play the variant of stag-hunt with the option of preliminary
communication than the stag-hunt without the option, and that these
are indeed two different games. In the stag-hunt game with an option
of preliminary communication, words are not merely cheap talk, but,
they are in the one-time prisoner’s dilemma game with an option of
preliminary communication. To be precise, we should not ignore the
variant of prisoner’s dilemma played publicly with unenforceable
agreements to cooperate: in this variant of the game, players will
respect their agreement to cooperate in cultures in which the refusal
to honor one’s commitment will damage one’s reputation
considerably.
In Aumann’s Nobel lecture we read, “the fundamental insight
is that repetition is like an enforcement mechanism.” 31 This insight
of Aumann is a clear refutation of Realpolitik that assumes that since
there is no institution to enforce agreements in international
relations, those agreements are worthless. Aumann’s insight
explains why covenants without sword waving can serve as much
more than mere words: they add significant strength to much needed
security. What we said contradicts Watkins assertion, 32 which states
that game theory endorses the claim of Hobbes: “covenants, without
the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”
We argue that game theory leads to the contrary conclusion: that
covenants may prevent war even without sword waving, more in
line with the observation of Hobbes. 33

Aumann, supra note 1, at 354.
John Watkins, Imperfect Rationality, in EXPLANATION IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 202–03 (Robert Borger and Frank Cioffi ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
33
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC
78 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., Frank Cass and Company Limited 1969): “In
contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as that nothing be by either party
performed for the present, when the contract is between such as are not
compellable, he that performeth first, considering the disposition of men to
take advantage of everything for their benefit, doth but betray himself
thereby to the covetousness, or other passion of him with whom he
31
32
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Game theory conflicts with the Realpolitik idea that
international agreements are not worth the paper on which they are
written. 34 Game theory similarly conflicts with the Realpolitik idea
that the rule of law does not matter since it can do no more than
reflect and legitimize extant balances of forces active between the
nations with no ability to change them. 35 This is the social
philosophy of Hegel that is popular today among the legal realist
movement. 36 Fortunately, this view meets with a very simple
refutation: a new enforceable law can prevent, or at least reduce,
situations of prisoner’s dilemma, which is agreeable to all parties
involved, so such a law has a great likelihood of changing an
undesirable Nash equilibrium in many games. 37

III. ADDITIONAL MORALS TO LEARN FROM AUMANN’S
NOBEL LECTURE (2005)
We offer two morals from Aumann’s Nobel lecture. The first
corresponds with his conclusion of his analysis of a particular
repeated game:

contracteth. And therefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no
reason why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to perform
afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that doubteth, shall be judge
himself . . . . But when there shall be such power coercive over both the
parties, as shall deprive them of their private judgments in this point; then
may such covenants be effectual; seeing he that performeth first shall have
no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other that may be
compelled thereunto.”
34
See Erik Ringmar, The Relevance of International Law: a
Hegelian Interpretation of a Peculiar Seventeenth-Century Preoccupation,
21 REV. OF INT’L STUDIES 87 n.1 (1995).
35
Id. at 91.
36
See id. at 101–02.
37
A game is in a Nash equilibrium only if no player has incentive
to change strategy unilaterally. See John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games.,
54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS S2 n.2, 286 (1951).
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“What is maintaining the equilibrium in these games is the
threat of punishment. If you like, call it ‘MAD’—mutually
assured destruction, the motto of the cold war.” 38
In the game, he analyzed it is indeed feasible to implement the
advice to punish the party that plays the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
with a hostile strategy. It may nevertheless be infeasible in
international relations, for example, in cases where punishment
leads to a response from a third player such as an umpire (it will not
be a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, but a mere variant of it). In an
effort to achieve a result of cooperation in the game, a player may
be ready to punish the opponent severely. Other parties may then
block the whole game, even in cases in which mutual cooperation is
achievable with relative ease. Even the option of lenient penalty may
be politically and scarcely feasible then. Therefore, an umpire may
prevent the game and sometimes lead one player to always
cooperate and the other to always defect. Let us propose these two
games that may be enforced by the umpire: a repeated unilateral
stag-hunt and a repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, it
is a super game; the umpire may force the states to play one of these
games; in other situations, the teacher may force the pupils to play
one of these games. In these games, one player can choose between
cooperation and defection, and the second player has only an option
of cooperation. The payoffs of the possible results of these games
are such that the payoffs of these results in the prisoners’ dilemma
or stag-hunt. Actually, the umpire deletes one of the lines in the
matrix of the game and by this makes it a new matrix—a new game.
This will be the matrix of the unilateral prisoner’s dilemma:
Coop

Coop

Def

1, 2

2, 1

Figure 4. The Unilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma
This will be the matrix of the unilateral stag-hunt:
Coop

38

Aumann, supra note 1, at 354.

Def
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2, 2

Figure 5. The Unilateral Stag-Hunt
One of the advantages of the variant of a repeated stag-hunt
with an umpire whose task is to force one player to avoid punishing
the other player, to enforce the repeated unilateral stag-hunt, on such
a variant of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, is this: in the repeated
unilateral stag-hunt, the players will reach mutual cooperation,
while in the repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma they will reach
the result in which one player will always defect and the other will
always cooperate. While mutual cooperation is a possible result (as
well as mutual defection) in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the
only possible result in the repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma is
that one player will always defect (this is their dominant strategy)
and the other player will always cooperate. Hence, international
intervention will be more desirable if it prevents the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma than if it prevents one side unilaterally from
defecting in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, if a state
believes that the umpire prevents them from defecting in a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, the state should prevent this game when
possible.
Notice that although in a prisoner’s dilemma game the response
to always-defect by always-defecting is reasonable and is possibly
the best winning strategy, it still poses a possible penalty. Similarly,
raising the reward for mutual cooperation or for being betrayed
unilaterally may make tit-for-tat the reasonable strategy even in the
prisoner’s dilemma. This is so since the risk of the tit-for-tat strategy
that incurs is reasonable: a player who adopts it takes a risk of losing
in the first round, but he gains the opportunity to achieve the payoff
of mutual cooperation, an opportunity that is not achievable by the
always-defect strategy. The rational choice between these two
options then depends, not only on the expectation that the opponent
will play tit-for-tat, but also on the time discount and on the distance
between the different payoffs (this fully accords with the complaint
of Bunge 1998 that game theoreticians do not consider sufficiently
critically the numbers that they write as examples for payoffs). 39

39

BUNGE, supra note 11, at 178.
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The second moral from Aumann’s theory is sober. The mutual
cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma depends on mutual
threat, sometimes a threat to use force or to punish. Therefore, a
change of the rules of the game that stabilizes mutual cooperation is
beneficial even when its players choose mutual cooperation as the
status quo. This is a challenge to the observation of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern that any “game is simply the totality of the rules
which describes it”: they obviously overlooked the possibility of
changing the rules of a game. 40 Constitutions often include some
formal rules for change, and every constitution is open to a
revolution. 41 This is so since even if the players achieve a Nash
equilibrium of cooperation; the equilibrium may not be stable for
some changes. Furthermore, there are equilibria of cooperation that
rest on mutual threats, and there are those that rest on mutual trust;
from a social science point of view, the latter is more stable and,
thus, more desirable.
A physical system is in an equilibrium when the net force on
each body in it is zero. It is stable if a small temporary deviation
from it does not destroy it. It is unstable if it does (the equilibrium
is indifferent if this deviation leads to another equilibrium).
Moreover, equilibrium is relative to the forces in question: a system
can be stable regarding only one set of extant forces. A game is in a
Nash equilibrium if, and only if, no player has incentive to change
strategy unilaterally. However, not all Nash equilibria are stable.
Consider not only strategy change but also changes in the rules.
Some equilibria remain stable even after such a change, but not after
a change in the mutual expectations. Thus, stability is a relative
matter.
One great advantage of the repeated stag-hunt game over the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is that only in the repeated staghunt game does each player always mutually cooperate, resulting in
a Nash equilibrium. Thus, pacifist players will gain most from
preferring to play stag-hunt over playing prisoner’s dilemma: a

VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 6, at 49.
See generally Herbert John Spiro, Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitutionpolitics-and-law.
40
41
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player committed to play “always cooperate” will achieve the best
result in all interactions, even where the received norm is mutual
defection. And then, remarkably, all parties to the game are better
off when they move from an equilibrium of mutual cooperation in
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to an equilibrium of mutual
cooperation in a repeated stag-hunt game.
One may question this observation by noticing that those two
equilibria allot the same payoffs to both players: this suggests there
is no advantage in the shift from the one game to the other. The
preference of more stable equilibria over less stable ones will lead
to the rejection of this suggestion. This generally holds true as long
as the more stable equilibrium does not impose stagnation;
otherwise, the objection to stagnation may change the preference.
Game theory is understandably an idealization, and, thus, it is not
sufficiently sensitive to account for the difference in degrees of
stability of the repeated game; this is no reason to overlook this
difference, however. It is generally a political mistake to overlook
degrees of stability, and it seems game theory can hardly help here
without first inviting some development or change. As it happens,
this oversight is common. Politicians systematically propose to end
a war by reinstating the status quo in hopes of avoiding the repetition
of past failed efforts at stability. At times, this hope for better
stability rests on better considerations of the balance of powers
between warring states. Game theory in its current state is unable to
critically examine such considerations, as it is not sensitive enough
to compare degrees of stability. It even overlooks the price for the
achievement and maintenance of mutual cooperation in games of the
prisoner’s dilemma. Parties to this sort of game may make
aggressive threats, which are costly even when there is no intention
to follow them up. And then, players have to weigh the cost of war
against the cost of the equilibrium within which peace depends on
the fragile tool of threats to fight back (this resembles the
equilibrium of peace in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma). Since the
consideration of waging war is expensive, it is wiser, whenever
possible, to change the situation to enable players to rely on trust,
which is the transition from the prisoner’s dilemma game to the staghunt game. This happened in Europe after World War II, it seems.
For now, peace is recognized as the best option for every European
Union country, even where an attack on a neighbor would lead to an
immediate surrender. This situation is obviously the best goal for all
international relations, as it achieves the most stable situation. In this
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situation, the peace will be stable, even if the two sides assess the
outcome of a potential war as advantageous for themselves (even to
the degree they are both convinced that they will definitively win
the war). This is quite intriguing because in most other sorts of
games this optimistic assessment of the results of wars usually leads
to wars. Game theory, to repeat, does not succeed in accounting for
the stability of the kind of game that leads to a Nash equilibrium of
peace since no degree of stability is intentionally built as yet into the
system of game theory.
We therefore recommend rendering game theory more sensitive
to degrees of stability of its equilibria. This includes stability of the
equilibrium when the rules are unstable or when players are
misinformed, commit common mistakes, or change their
preferences midgame. 42 It also includes stability of the equilibrium
when new players enter the game or when the available set of
alternatives for current players change. The development should be
more fruitful as a toolbox to achieve stable world peace. 43 The ideal

Howard et al. discuss a meta-game for which prospective players
may choose their emotions, preferences, and even rationality. Players’ selfinterest will influence these and make some of their threats and promises
credible; they will then rationally promote their chosen preferences.
Howard et al. say, “often (as a player) one would be better placed
strategically if one’s preferences (P) were replaced by other preferences
(P’). With preferences P’, one would be in a stronger position to pursue
one’s original preferences P. Fundamentally, this happens because players
can make use of each other’s preferences as a means to obtain their ends.”
Now, if in the former game the players can adopt such moves, they do not
improve their situation in the central game but prevent the central game;
they make it another game. This is so since objective rules and options do
not suffice to determine the game, as payoff for players signify too. Oddly,
Howard et al. dismiss this rather obvious consideration. Nigel Howard ET
AL., Manifesto for a Theory of Drama and Irrational Choice, 44 J.
OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y, Jan. 1993, at 99, 100. See also, Nigel Howard,
The Present and Future of Metagame Analysis, EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES.
32.1, 1987, at 1.
43
There are different sorts of equilibria in game theory, and they
may be perceived to present different degrees of stability, but not in a way
that will be fruitful for handling the problems we present here. We invite
our readers to challenge us and correct our mistakes; we will be grateful for
this.
42
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of international relations would naturally be a solution of this kind,
whenever possible. The hope, that we suggest will make it more
viable, is that this situation is achievable by building widespread
expectations for the application in international courts of strict laws
against aggressive national leaders. At the very least, we should
welcome efforts to minimize all incentives for political leaders to
break international law or to ignore its summons or rulings. All this
is easier said than done, of course. Our point, however, is that it is
common sense and obvious from the viewpoint of game theory, as
it should be. The generally received observation is that no one wants
game theory to make recommendations that conflict with the public
interest. And it is almost a consensus that the public interest is to
make peace a top priority in all cases except for intolerable situations
like enslavement or destabilization that worsens the situation (as
symbolized by the compromise that Britain accepted in Munich in
1938). 44 If there is a situation in which war is better than peace, this
should be subject to critical discussion, together with all possible
answers to the question, what compromise is tolerable. Can game
theory in its current version help the search for a reasonable answer
to such a discussion? The answer, it seems on its face, is presentday game theory is useless for that purpose. We have argued that
this is not true: present-day game theory may help rethink how to
mitigate situations that threaten peace, admittedly, when degrees of
stability signify greatly this is the case. And then, we say, it need not
be so since game theory can nevertheless help one rethink the extent
of the desirability of raising the degree of stability of peace and,
thus, the cost that it is worthwhile to meet that end. And, observe,

See, Munich Agreement, Fr.-Ger.-Gr. Brit.-It., Sept. 29, 1938, The
Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School.
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Abraham Wald has shown the way. 45 Considering chains of games
and sub-games will be a useful extension of current game theory. 46
We suggest then that the most significant achievement of game
theory is not in the design or in the applications of games, but in the
suggestions of what games are unwise to play. Here, we follow
Popper (Popper 1945), who said, politically, preventing pain or
suffering has priority over creating pleasure. Obviously, in game
theory, prevention is also much easier than application because
every game requires some conditions for its very applicability, and
these are never too clear and are seldom part of game theory proper.
The games we consider unwise to play are obviously dangerous, as
they may lead to war. The paradigm case here is
chicken/brinkmanship. To our regret, game theoreticians are often
more concerned with the best way to play them. Even if they are
right, we prefer not to join them, but to recommend the proposal to
avoid playing them when possible. At times, the game theoreticians
in question stress that peaceful games fit some utopian situations so
that in the meantime war is inevitable. We say, even if some war is
inevitable, we should do our best to try to prevent every specific case
of impending war, giving the good Lord the benefit of the doubt.

IV. CONCLUSION
Here then is our major corollary to game theory: the tools for
achieving cooperation are incentives that generate strong and
significant expectations: in brief, hope. The incentives may be

45
See Abraham Wald, Statistical Decision Functions Which
Minimize the Maximum Risk, Annals of Mathematics, 46 ANNALS
MATHEMATICS, Second Series, Apr. 1945, at 265. See also Abraham Wald,
Statistical Decision Functions (1950). See also Jacob Wolfowitz, J 1952.
Abraham Wald, 1902–1950, The ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
23, 1–13 (1952).
46
See Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, Quitting Games, 26
MATHEMATICS OPERATIONS RES., May 2001, at 265. Solan and Vieille
discuss the system in which players have the choice between quitting and
continuing to play. They impose on games limitations that increase their
mathematical elegance. Alas, these limitations lose the empirical character
of games that gamblers play and of games that are important in social
studies.

2020

GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS

23

supplied by the legal system and by the norms and customs of civil
society. The expectations may be products of institutions created to
raise trust and join the educational or the diplomatic system.
Surprisingly, a little success in trust-building may have a huge,
dramatic, and positive impact on situations like the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. Is this moral from game theory true? This is an
empirical question not discussed here. That it deserves such
discussions is obvious from the huge success of every educator who
tried to reach neglected youths. Still, it is important to notice that the
theory suggests that trust is superior to defection as the default
option, thus, opening a venue to its empirical tests.
We recommend adding hope to the incentives and expectations
of standard economic theory. Of course, appropriate incentives may
generate hope, but they may also generate despair—intentionally or
not. People can expect the best (that sounds hopeful), and they can
expect the worst. Yet the logic of the ascription of expectations to
rational agents differs from that of hope, since, unlike expectation
theory, the theory of hope requires the will to live as more basic than
any expectation, rational or not. As it happens, game theory evolved
during the Cold War under the strong influence of economic theory
and expectations theory. The theory of hope awaits proper
development. We suggest that this step will also promote peace.

